This paper investigates whether, in theoretical terms, corporations can be citizens. The argument is based on the observation that the debate on 'corporate citizenship' (CC) has only paid limited attention to the actual notion of citizenship. Where it has been discussed, authors have either largely left the concept of CC unquestioned, or applied rather unidimensional and decontextualized notions of citizenship to the corporate sphere. The paper opens with a discussion of the nature and role of metaphors for business and of the contestable nature of the political concept of citizenship. It considers corporations as citizens in terms of (a) legal and political status; and (b) participants in civic processes. These issues are addressed through a four-dimensional framework of democratic citizenship offered by Stokes (2002) . The analysis suggests that corporations do not easily fit the liberal minimalist model of citizenship. It finds, however some possibilities for fit with the three more participatory models. There is fit with the most important of these, civic republicanism , through the activity of participation in social affairs. The paper finds that corporations can share in two levels of participation (by acting as pressure groups and by participating in governing). There are also possibilities of corporations sharing the characteristics of developmental and deliberative citizenship, though these raise particular evaluative issues. The paper concludes by refuting the notion of corporations having citizenship by virtue of legal and political status, but maps out specific criteria by which we might determine whether corporations could be considered as citizens by virtue of their participation in processes of governance.
Introduction
The term 'corporate citizenship' (CC) has been used increasingly by corporations, consultants and scholars to echo, underscore, extend, or re-orient certain aspects of corporate social responsibility. However, the introduction of this terminology raises important questions about the role of corporations, particularly at a time when there are growing demands for a critical review of the institutions of business and society.
As van Luijk 2001 suggests, the usage of this new terminology was chiefly practitioner driven -and as such not without some pragmatic justification. The term first began to be used by corporations and the business press in the US in the 1980s, and has since become a popular way of labeling the social responsibilities and behaviors of corporations (Altman and Vidaver-Cohen 2000) . To give just a few examples: Ford claims that 'Corporate citizenship has become an integral part of every d ecision and action we take' 1 ; GlaxoSmithKline suggests that it 'makes substantial investments in its … corporate citizenship programmes' 2 ; and Siemens contends that 'dialogue with society and responsible corporate citizenship are more vital than ever before.' 3 Indeed, the language of CC is now as much a feature of the discourse of European companies, as it is their US counterparts.
Usage of the term CC is also certainly no longer confined merely to the practitioner discourse. It has been enthusiastically embraced by academics, consultants, government units, NGOs, and others, raising serious doubts for some about its content and justification. Matten et al (2003) for example suggest that the application of CC terminology by both academics and practitioners has been inconsistent, unclear, and at times arbitrary. Their analysis of the more academic literature on CC suggests two particularly significant results in this respect. First, the overwhelming majority of users employ CC chiefly as just a new label for elements of corporate philanthropy or social responsibility that have been discussed for more than thirty 1 years. Under this aspect, CC seems to offer nothing substantially new apart from a new brand for a re-launch of quite dated concepts. Second, only a m inority of
commentators have yet attempted to address the fact that this re-invigoration of the CSR discourse makes use of the term 'citizenship' and challenges the connotations, implications and -potentially -innovations linked to the usage of this terminology.
Among the few contributors to have deliberately addressed the notion of 'citizenship'
are Donna Wood and Jeanne Logsdon (Wood and Logsdon, 2001; Logsdon and Wood 2002) . Wood and Logsdon share some of our anxieties about the uncritical use of the term CC, but also identify some reasons to attach the term citizenship to, for example, business rights and duties, and stakeholder relationships. Their analysis focuses on three views of citizenship: the "minimalist" (i.e. liberal) view; the communitarian view; and the universal rights view.
We share Wood and Logsdon's dismissal of a simple interpretation of CC in terms of a liberal minimalist view. We also share their recommendation to those considering the application of the citizenship model to business that they move 'from the minimalist to a communitarian view ' (2002: 95) . Their view of citizenship is basically dichotomous, differentiating into a liberal and a communitarian view. Their study continues by adding a third, namely territorial, dimension and the implications of shifting from the level of the 'local polity' to the global community for what they refer to as 'business citizenship'. Notwithstanding the importance of globalization both for the practice and the theorization of business citizenship 4 , our present intention is to interrogate more closely the appropriateness of different conceptions of citizenship for corporations, territory apart.
We argue that a dichotomous view of citizenship based on liberal versus communitarian views is theoretically flawed and limits the insights that the metaphor can offer to the analysis of corporations. We would rather argue that contemporary political theory suggests a continuum comprising various aspects of liberal and communitarian citizenship, and in which the liberal element is present throughout, we consider the relevance of these conceptions of citizenship as participation to corporations' social and political relations. We conclude with a more general discussion of the opportunities and responsibilities that would attend the increased attribution / assumption of citizenship roles to / by business.
CC as a political metaphor in business
The introduction of 'citizenship' terminology from politics, and its application to corporate actors, represents a move to the metaphorical. Alluding to corporations in terms of citizenship does not literally mean that corporations are citizens or have citizenship, but that their substance or their actions can be understood as being in some meaningful way similar to that of citizens or citizenship. As such, the term CC is metaphorical, and is one of many metaphors used in the analysis of organizational life and in the projection of business images and brands.
As Morgan (1980) argues, the metaphors of the machine (e.g. Weber, Taylor) and the organism (e.g. Spencer, Parsons) have been at the heart of organizational analysis. However, since the 1960s other metaphors have been used in order to understand organizations in new, and specifically non-functionalist, ways.
Importantly, Morgan notes that:
The most powerful use of metaphor arises in instances in which the differences between the two phenomena are seen to be significant but not total…the logic of There will always be debate about CC's meaning, merits, and appropriateness.
There is an internal dynamic to this debate as new models of CC are developed against which practices are judged. As Marshall said of the political concept of citizenship:
Societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be measured (1950: 29) The nature of these debates reflects social and business contexts within firms, among firms, within countries and among countries. Recognizing that, like its related political concepts, the metaphor of CC is essentially contested does not, of course, obviate the need for closer investigation into its theoretical appropriateness.
What is citizenship?
We now turn to considering the appropriateness of the concept of citizenship for corporations and the appropriateness of corporations for citizenship. We are concerned here with two key issues: do corporations metaphorically conform with the status and with the key process, namely participation, of human citizenship?
In order to do so, we draw from, and build upon, Stokes' (2002) four main models of democracy and citizenship -liberal minimalist, civic republicanism, developmental democracy, and deliberative democracy -to elucidate different modes of participation. As Stokes himself observes, this is a process of 'historical and conceptual simplification' but it 'serves to isolate the key characteristics and normative principles… and enables their comparison ' (2002: 27) . He evaluates these models with reference to two variables, civic engagement and capacity for [self] critique to which we will turn in our concluding discussion.
Four views of citizenship and their appropriateness for corporations

Liberal Minimalism
Liberal minimalist theories see citizens as in need of protection from arbitrary rule and oppression by government (Stokes 2002: 27-31) . These are either rights-or utilitarian-based. Rights-based conceptions of citizenship owe most to John Locke 
Civic Republicanism
Civic republicanism (Stokes 2002: 31-34) shares the assumptions of equal legal rights and political equality with liberal minimalism but it also prizes the 'public or civic good', rather than assuming that the public good is simply an aggregation of individual goods. Civic republicanism is often underpinned by a set of communitarian ties (e.g. McIntyre 1984; Taylor 1992; Waltzer 1983) or 'moral bonds' (Oldfield 1990: 148) that provide a motivational basis for civic virtue. Accordingly, it prizes obligations such as obeying the law, paying taxes, performing jury and even military service.
Valuing the civic good and meeting one's obligations is described as 'civic virtue'. In contrast to the political division of labor noted above, in this model citizenship is a political activity which both forms and expresses the will of the people, and which expresses one commitment to the community (Stokes 2002: 32) .
Although corporations cannot share in the obligations of jury service, 6 obedience to the law and paying taxes are clearly criteria of citizenship that they can fulfill.
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Broadly speaking, there is evidence that corporations are capable not only of recognizing public goods but also that business success is critically dependent on this and that corporations can contribute to their maintenance and revival. Moon (1995) argues that this recognition informs a shift from concerns with internal social pre-requisites of business captured in the managerialism of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1967) to a concern with the external social pre-requisites of business.
This recognition of mutual dependency is precisely the sort of sentiment that underpins Stokes' civic republicanism, which not only presumes the recognition of public goods but also expects the citizen to pursue these through civic participation. It has been argued, most famously by Dahl (1956) example. In these cases, the political division of labor between government and citizens is maintained but the citizens avail themselves of increased opportunities to inform agendas and the definition of issues.
There is also an interest in collectivist opportunities for increased participation which do not assume a political division of labor. Hirst, for example, argues for associationalism, contending that:
… human welfare and liberty are best served where as many of the affairs of society as possible are managed by voluntary and democratically self-governing associations (1993: 112).
Once again, we find evidence that corporations are participating in this more direct form of citizenship. We identify two broad wa ys in which corporations can participate in governing: (i) sharing in new governance in developed political systems; (ii) assuming neo-government roles within the corporation's usual economic activities.
The first form is in the complex relationships that arise in 'new governance' in developed political systems. Moon (2002) argues that this is in the context of governments seeking to share responsibilities and to develop new modes of operation, whether as a result of overload or of a view that they do not have a monopoly of solutions for society. This is often in the form of 'social' partnerships with non-profit and for-profit organizations (Waddock 1988; Moon and Sochacki 1998) . health, and education. This is especially likely to be the case where regulation is weak, or where the welfare state is fragile or in retreat, and corporations might be expected to assume some of the burdens of ensuring that basic rights are met.
Similarly, the y argue that consumers, investors, and others might rely on the actions of corporations to ensure that their fundamental rights to property and basic services are protected. In extreme cases, particularly in developing countries, multinational corporations are increasingly expected to participate in governing where there was previously a governance vacuum, thereby undertaking to institute and enforce entirely new rules and norms to safeguard individual rights.
We can therefore see that corporations are able to participate in ways that are also assumed of citizens in civic republicanism. This extends from their propensity to operate like pressure groups in raising and defining issues and pressing claims through to participating in decision-making and to sharing responsibility for governing. We have suggested two ways in which corporations share in governing:
first by contributing to societal governance issues outside the firm, often in partnerships with governmental or non-governmental organizations; and second, by administering rights within the normal operations of the firm.
Developmental Democracy
Thus far we have seen that, whereas the classical view of political participation entails citizens ruling and being ruled, liberal-democracy and mass society have combined to yield a political division of labor, such that Schumpeter assumes the only appropriate form of participation to be periodic voting. This minimalist view has been extended within civic republicanism, which envisages wider opportunities for citizen involvement in informing or even participating in policy-making and in governing. We have seen how corporations can be drawn into such forms of participation.
Conceptions of citizenship within developmental democracy (Stokes 2002: 34-39) offer the view that to flourish, democratic polities require citizens who are highly There is much in the use of the term sustainability by corporations which gestures in this direction. In particular, we suggest that 'triple bottom line' thinking, with its commitments to social justice, environmental responsibility, and economic development is predicated on an assumption that business can and should provide a major contribution to society through a long-term commitment to social participation (Elkington 1999) . This is illustrated in HewlettPackard's conceptualization of itself as an organization which 'is helping people overcome barriers to social and economic progress' and as 'learning to compete 'better in the region (south Asia) and around the world' as a result of its engagement in the Kuppam region of India. This is not only described as the company's responsibility to the Aids infected area but also in terms of the value that the Kuppan community will contribute to Hewlett Packard. (Dunn and Yamashita 2003) . It is also evident in the way in which the carpet manufacturer, Interface, describes its aim:
… to engage every person in the Interface family worldwide in a collaborative discussion to develop a common understanding of our vision and mission, to identify and explore values throughout the company … We will return to the questions of whether the assumption of human flourishing within the developmental model offers a metaphor for corporations, and the compatibility of this with wider assumptions about societal flourishing.
Deliberative Democracy
Stokes' fourth view of citizenship is in the context of deliberative democracy (2002: 39 -44). This not only emphasizes citizen participation in public affairs but also assumes that they participate in a deliberative fashion enabling them to better address issues of complexity, pluralism, and inequality in decision-making.
Reference to the reality of pluralism constitutes skepticism about a single moral view uniting the polity, which civic republicanism tends to assume. Cohen (1997: 73) suggests that the outcomes of deliberative democracy are only legitimate 'if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned argument among equals'. This is in greatest contrast to the representative model, which is incapable of involving the citizen in the resolution of the complexities of decision-making. Adherents argue that deliberative participation constrains the articulation and pursuit of self-interest as well as contributing to individual flourishing. The citizen would become used to and good at listening to and understanding other perspectives (see Boman 1996; Dryzek 1990; Fishkin 1995) . This model emphasizes equality, which raises the issue discussed above of the significance of corporation-specific resources in political processes.
The model of deliberative democratic citizenship does not principally add another level of engagement to the three dimensions adumbrated above; rather it specifies a style of engagement which emphasizes a problem-solving approach rather than a show of hands or a meeting of wills. The emphasis is less on the resolution of competing interests and more upon the identification of solutions through deliberative participation. In the literature on business and society relations, such a concept has been discussed for some time, though under different labels and assumptions. For example, in application of Habermas' (1983) concept of discourse ethics, Steinmann and Löhr (1994) have proposed corporate dialogues, mediation processes, and other fora, to both involve citizens in corporate decisions as well as making corporations active and accountable members of their respective communities. As befits a deliberative democracy model, discourse ethics prescribes rules for a process of participation in governance. As such, the main criteria for those taking part in participative discourses are impartiality, non-persuasiveness, non-coercion, and expertise (Preuss 1999) , thereby underscoring the appreciation f or individual freedom and autonomy in the deliberative model.
The idea of discourse participation has been used quite widely especially in environmental disputes, for example by the US-EPA in regulatory negotiations (Fiorino 1995) . One major challenge for such discourses though is in overcoming conflicts about values. On the positive side, they have the potential to enable collective decisions which are informed by the expertise and values of all those who are affected by a decision. The proximity of deliberative citizenship and discourse ethics from a business perspective lies in the fact that both specifically envisage the direct involvement of citizens in the governance of public affairs.
Ultimately, deliberative democracy also comes close to ideals d eveloped in stakeholder theory, especially in relation to the term 'stakeholder democracy' (Freeman 1984) . The actual extent to which corporations engage in the various participatory forms of governance in a deliberative way is an empirical question.
Interestingly, the model does have a strong resonance with the call for increased stakeholder participation and dialogue. Even though this is advocated for strategic as well as ethical reasons, Freeman's expectation is that stakeholder relations should be on the basis of voluntary negotiation of corporations with multiple stakeholders on critical issues to secure voluntary agreements and, more broadly, that corporations should serve stakeholder needs (1984: 78 -80).
Discussion and Conclusions
This relatively brief foray has provided a range of perspectives about citizenship of people in democracy. This has been used as a basis for considering the appropriateness of citizenship models for corporations. This conclusion is consistent with Wood and Logsdon (2001: 94) nb this also goes for utilitarianbased models which, notwithstanding their view that natural rights are 'nonsense on stilts', still presume a basic entitlement to legal and political status.
As we move through the different models of citizenship, it is clear that roles and responsibilities, corporations aside, become more blurred. In the minimalist view, it is taken for granted that the political division of labor operates (between elections governments rule and citizens are ruled). In modern variants of civic republicanism, governments do not disappear but there is still an expectation that representative bodies participate in decision-making, be they defined as organized interests (Dahl) or societal associations (Hirst) . The legitimacy of these participants is principally functional. The developmental and deliberative citizenship models both assume that participation combines individual and social benefits, although the deliberative model assumes that the former are suppressed in the activity of engaging with substantive approaches to problem solving rather than continuing to assert particularistic ones.
This all suggests that, corporations apart, lines of responsibility and issues of legitimacy are in flux.
However, these supra-minimalist models of citizenship emphasize not only status but also process. We suggested that in their engagement in new governance, particularly through partnerships with governments and societal organizations, and in their role in the administration of rights, corporations are sharing in the doing of government.
Corporations can participate in governance issues (ruling as well as being ruled).
There are no a priori reasons why they should not aspire to do so in a developmental fashion: like individual citizens, they may have an interest in benefiting from participation. Similarly, there are no a priori reasons why they should not do so in deliberative ways. The stakeholder approach is (or can be) consistent with this.
However, a number of evaluative issues remain for corporations to be recognized as acting in citizenly ways, participating in debates, sharing in decision-making, and sharing the responsibilities of governing. A third issue emerging from the above is that of the private interests that corporations bring with them. Clearly, there is business proclivity for engaging directly in the political process in order to press their case on public policy questions (see Reich, 1998) . But it is unclear that this uniquely applies to corporations. As noted, the major premise of liberal citizenship is self-interest and although this is less a driving motivation in the supra-minimalist models, contributors all point to the individual benefits of participation. Stokes endorses Anne Phillips ' (2000) contention that republicanism is capable of providing:
… an insecure resolution of 'that tension between insisting that different groups do have distinct and different interests and nonetheless projecting a vision of politics as something more than looking after yourself' (Stokes 2002: 34) This suggests that in political theory, as in debates about business, there is an acceptance that participation entails tolerating some overlap between private and public interest.
A fourth and final criterion for excluding corporations from the category of citizenship entirely could be their relative power premised, for example, on wealth, on the structural dependencies that they create (e.g. for work, income), or on their access to other key decision-makers (e.g. in government). Indeed Dahl himself (1985) recognized problems with his own earlier arguments as he came to the view that businesses possessed such economic power that they could not be equated with surrogate citizens. Rather, in the same way as governments need to be constrained for liberals, Dahl argued that firms needed to be subject to democratic processes. It is not clear that Dahl's argument is conclusive. As he indicated in his earlier work (1956, 1961) , different sorts of political resources are efficacious in different contexts.
In other words, corporate power does not always trump the mobilization of ideas; popular majorities, other coalitions and, moreover, corporations are often aligned against each other in policy debates (see Vogel 1983 Vogel , 1986 . Therefore the issue of power differentials in civic republicanism may not be as straightforward as first thought. However, it may nonetheless be appropriate to consider either the extent to which the powerful, be they corporations or otherwise, have incentives to exercise self-restraint, or the sorts of countervailing powers that need to be institutionalized in participatory models of governance.
In sum, we concur with Wood and Logsdon (2001) that the metaphor of citizenship on grounds of legal and political s tatus through the minimalist model is not appropriate for corporations. We do argue, however, that corporations could reasonably claim to act as if they were metaphorically citizens in that their engagement in society resembles the key process of citizenship, participation. We suggest, though, that there are various metaphors for participation, ranging from the indirect in the form of participation as pressure groups, to the deliberative model which entails directs participation in order to resolve problems rather than to press particular interests. These processes of participation are expected of various other collective organizations that participate by informing policy-debate, share in policymaking, and shoulder some of the responsibilities for governing.
We conclude that our interrogation of the metaphor of citizenship is a useful one.
With reference to Morgan's (1980) above justification for the use of metaphors for the study of organizations, the differences between human citizens and corporations are significant but not total. Thus whilst the metaphor does not apply to all aspects of corporate activities it has generated powerful insights into different forms and norms of business participation in society.
Those who wish to exclude corporations from a proper discussion of citizenship altogether need to demonstrate that corporations are unique among collective interests in bringing to the participatory process bundles of private interests incompatible with public interests, and have uniquely disproportionate and inappropriate power. Those who wish to encourage the association of corporations with the metaphor of citizenship need to demonstrate ways in which corporations are able to balance individual and social benefits and to participate in deliberative activities. They might also consider how corporations can empirically respond to the evaluative issues sketched above, particularly in the respect of doubts about their power and interest. They would need to demonstrate that through developmental and deliberative citi zenship processes, corporations are capable of transforming themselves, a process which Stokes as a concomitant of the ideal citizen. Finally, they would also have to address whether an institutionally grounded notion such as citizenship can be indiscriminately applied to an entire population of corporations when the institutional contexts in which corporations are currently operating are so varied and dynamic.
